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The Internet and the Abiding Significance of
Territorial Sovereignty
JACK L. GOLDSMITH*
INTRODUCTION
More than any other technology, the Internet facilitates cheap, fast, and
difficult-to-detect multi-jurisdictional transactions. This in a nutshell is why so
many believe that the Internet "undermin[es] the feasibility-and legitimacy--of
laws based on geographical boundaries."' Dean Henry H. Perritt's essay is
sanguine about the Internet's ability to facilitate national governance.' But even
Perritt appears skeptical about the efficacy of territorial regulation of the
Internet. His arguments for the Internet's potential to strengthen national and
international governance are tempered by doubts about whether regulation
conceived in territorial terms can effectively govern Internet transactions.3
This essay attempts to alleviate Perritt's doubt. It aims to show that from
the perspective of jurisdiction and choice of law, territorial regulation of the
Internet is no less feasible and no less legitimate than territorial regulation of
non-Internet transactions.
* Associate Professor, University of Chicago Law School. Thanks to Andrew Guzman for helpful
comments, and Greg Jacob for excellent research assistance.
I. See David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN.
L. REv. 1367, 1367 (1996).
2. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The Internet as a Threat to Sovereignty? Thoughts on the Internet's Role
in Strengthening National and Global Governance, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STuD. 423, 436-37 (1998).
3. Perritt, The Internet as a Threat to Sovereignty, supra note 2, at 426-27. The Internet is "not
susceptible to the same physical and regulatory controls as telegraph, telephone, radio, and television
technologies." Id at 426. Perritt notes the "difficulty in imposing border controls on Internet communications."
Id. "The Internet may very well be a direct threat to certain types of conceptions about sovereignty-those that
rely on maximum, centralized control over the life of a people." Id See also Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Jurisdiction
in Cyberspace, 41 Viu. L. REv. 1, 1 (1996) ("Conduct with potentially serious legal consequences is difficult
for traditional sovereigns to control in the [Global Information Infiastructure] because it is ephemeral, invisible,
and crosses geographical boundaries easily."). However, Perritt is a moderate on this issue. Compare Johnson
& Post, supra note I.
4. My arguments about the relevance ofterritorial sovereignty to Internet transactions apply with similar
(but not identical) force to national sovereigns and sub-national quasi-sovereigns (such as the several states).
Throughout this essay I will use focus on "national" territorial regulation as opposed to "sub-national"
territorial regulation unless otherwise indicated.
475
GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES JOURNAL
I. TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY
"Sovereignty" has many meanings. In this essay I analyze the relevance to
the Internet of a particular conception of territorial sovereignty. A nation
possesses territorial sovereignty in the sense that it exercises the principal
means of authority within a given territory. Territorial sovereignty so
conceived does not commit one to the realist conception of sovereignty that
Perritt criticizes.6 It is consistent with the view that non-governmental
organizations and extra-territorial factors significantly influence governmental
options and other events within the territory, and that persons and firms can
evade regulation by avoiding a territorial presence.7
Territorial sovereignty is relevant to Internet regulation in a straightforward
fashion. The Internet is not, as many suggest, a separate place removed from
our world. Like the telephone, the telegraph, and the smoke signal, the Internet
is a medium through which people in real space in onejurisdiction communicate
with people in real space in another jurisdiction. Territorial sovereignty
supports national regulation of persons within the territory who use the Internet.
It also supports national regulation of the means of communication-Internet
hardware and software-located in the territory. Finally, a nation's prerogative
to control events within its territory entails the power to regulate the local
effects of extraterritorial acts.' When a person abroad uses the Internet to
5. See Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective, 21 COMP. POL. STuD. 66, 86
(1988) ("The assertion of final authority within a given territory is the core element in any definition of
sovereignty."). Id. Janice E. Thomson, Sovereignty in Historical Perspective: The Evolution of State
Control over Extraterritorial Violence, in THE ELUSIVE STATE: INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVES 227, 227 (James A. Caporaso ed., 1989) ("Despite their debate over whether the state is a
withering colossus or a highly adaptive entity, international relations theorists agree on an even more
fundamental point. Both liberal interdependence and realist theories rest on the assumption that the state
controls at least the principal means of coercion."). Id. (citations omitted).
6. See Perritt, The Internet as a Threat to Sovereignty, supra note 2, at 425.
7. See Janice E. Thomson & Stephen D. Krasner, Global Transactions and the Consolidation of
Sovereignty, in GLOBALCHANOESANDTHEOREnCALCHALLENGES: APPROACHESTO WORLD POLITICS FORTHE
1990s 195, 198-206 (Ernst-Otto Czempiel & James N. Rosenau eds., 1989).
8. Some commentators suggest that this effects criterion for local regulation constitutes a rejection of
territorial sovereignty as traditionally conceived. See, eg., Larry Kramer, Vestiges of Beale: Extraterritorial
Application ofAmerican Law, 1991 SuP. CT. REV. 179, 202 (1992). To the contrary, however, the traditional
territorialists recognized that "[aicts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing
detrimental effects within itjustify a State in punishing the cause of the harm as if he had been present at the
effect...." Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280,285 (1911) (Holmes, J.). This point flows from the traditional
conception's emphasis on plenary sovereign power within the territory. It is true, however, that the effects test
for territorialjwisdiction has greater prominence now than in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries.
Several reasons explain this change. All conflicts of law problems by definition have connections to two or more
territorial jurisdictions. A dominant version oftraditional territorialism-best represented by Joseph Beale-used
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produce harmful local effects, the local sovereign isjustified in regulating these
local effects." These various forms of legitimate territorial regulation enable
nations to significantly raise the cost of, and thus to regulate, proscribed
Internet transactions.10
The arguments against this view begin with empirical assumptions about
Internet architecture." A distinguishing feature of the Internet is that protocol
addresses do not necessarily correlate with physical location. This means that
persons transacting in cyberspace sometimes cannot know each other's physical
location and cannot control the geographical flow of content. In addition,
information mediated by many Internet services can appear simultaneously in
all jurisdictions around the world. Finally, information transmitted on the
Internet can easily flow across national borders without detection.
There are many reasons to question these empirical and technological,
claims. 2 In this essay I want to focus instead on legal and conceptual
arguments against territorial regulation of the Internet. There are three basic
undermined Beale's notion of a uniquely legitimate governing law in conflicts cases. The massive increase in
transjurisdictional transactions during the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries exacerbated the number and
scope of conflicts of law. The rise of the regulatory state led to more caustic public policy differences among
states and pressured interested fora to apply local regulations whenever possible. These changes in the world
combined with changes in legal and related conceptual understandings. The legal realists demolished Beale's
intellectual edifice, and showed that nothing in the logic of territorialism justified legal regulation by any one
of several territories that had connections to the transaction in question. See WALTER WHEELER COOK, THE
LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICTOF LAWS 311-22,351-70,433-37 (1949); ERNESTG. LoRENzEN,
SELECTEDARTICLES ONTHECONFLICTOF LAWS (1947). The realists successfully argued that any jurisdiction
with a sufficient connection to a case can with justification apply its law to the case. This, in a nutshell, is the
effects criterion, a criterion that constitutes an expanded conception of territorial sovereignty, not a rejection of
the conception.
9. This effects criterion is a pervasive and well-settled feature ofdomestic and international conflicts of
law. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981). The Constitution permits a state to apply its law if
it has a "significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that the choice
of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair." Id. at 313. Similarly, "[i]ntemational law permits
nations to regulate extraterritorial activity with local effects." RESTATEmENT(THIRD) OFTHE oREGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE U.S. § 403 (1987).
10. For my more comprehensive analysis, see Jack Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHi. L. REV.
(forthcoming 1998).
11. See Perritt, Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, supra note 3, at 1-2; Johnson & Post, supra note I, at 1370-
76.
12. For example, the central empirical assumption that Internet content providers cannot control where
and to whom their content flows is either misleading or wrong. See Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, supra
note 10. Content providers can control these flows through a variety ofmeans ranging from conditioning access
on presentation of age or geographical identification to labeling and rating for filtering software. These and
other forms of information flow control are neither perfect nor costless. But neither is control over the
transjurisdictional effects of non-Interet activities. Moreover, the accuracy ofIntemet content control is rapidly
rising, and the costs ofsuch control are rapidly diminishing. Although technological predictions in this context
are perilous, there is presently every reason to believe these trends will continue. For further analysis, see id.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES JOURNAL
arguments to this effect.'3 First, territorial regulation of the Internet is not
feasible because the source of Internet transactions can easily be located outside
ofthe regulating sovereign's territory. Second, unilateral territorial regulation
of the Internet leads to overlapping and often inconsistent regulation of the same
transaction. Third, unilateral territorial regulation of the Internet produces
significant, normatively problematic spillover effects. I consider each argument
in turn.
II. REGULATION EVASION
The first argument against territorial regulation of the Internet concerns
regulatory leakage. This is an argument about the infeasibility of territorial
regulation of the Internet. Because Internet information flows cross territorial
borders without detection, and because Internet content providers can shift with
relative ease the source of their information flows outside of any regulating
territory, 4 much of the content of the Internet is beyond the regulatory scope of
any particular territorial sovereignty.
It is true that it is costly (but not impossible)"5 to arrest the flow of Internet
protocol packets over territorial borders. It is also true that these information
flows often have an extraterritorial source. But these features do not distinguish
the Internet from real space transnational transactions for which territorial
regulation is a common and effective tool. Persons acting abroad often do
things that cause adverse effects within the regulating jurisdiction that cannot
be intercepted at the border. For example, when English reinsurers conspire in
England to limit the types ofreinsurance sold in the United States, U.S. customs
13. An extreme statement of these arguments is found in Johnson & Post, supra note 1. For a more
nuanced assessment, see Perritt, Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, supra note 3.
14. Content providers can do this by, among other ways, locating physically beyond the regulating
jurisdiction or by employing technology like telnet or anonymous remailers.
15. For example, China regulates access to the Internet through (among other means) centrally regulated
servers. See China Tightens Control Over Internet, INDEPENDENT (UK), Dec. 31, 1997 ("All locally-dialed
internet servers available in China must send traffic leaving the country through nodes controlled by the
Ministry of Post and Telecommunications and there is widespread belief that targeted screening of this interet
use is routine."). Perritt acknowledges this point. See Perritt, The Internet as a Threat to Sovereignty, supra
note 2, at 426. See also Timothy S. Wu, Cyberspace Sovereignty? - The Internet and the International
System, 10 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 647,652 (1997).
[Vol. 5:475
19981 THE ABIDING SIGNIFICANCE OF TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY 479
officials cannot stop the harm to American insurers and insureds atthe border. 6
The local economic harm of foreign activity is similarly impossible to stop at
the border when a foreign corporation makes a fraudulent tender offer on
foreign soil for a foreign corporation owned in very small part by Americans. 7
In the modem interdependent international economy, these economic effects are
oblivious to border control. The point is not limited to economic effects.
Harmful pollution that wafts from one state into another is also difficult to
intercept at the state line.'
Does the inability of governments to stop these harmful effects at the border
mean that the extraterritorial sources of these local harms are beyond local
regulation? Of course not. Some harmful effects cannot be intercepted at the
border and thus must be regulated expost through legal sanctions (or ex ante
through the threat of such sanctions). In each of the three non-Interet
examples above, for example, the jurisdiction that suffered the harmful effects
applied its laws to the extraterritorial activity. Internet activities are
functionally identical to these non-Intemet activities. People in onejurisdiction
do something-upload pornography, facilitate gambling, offer a fraudulent
security, send spain, etc.-that is costly to stop at anotherjurisdiction's border
and that produces effects within that jurisdiction deemed illegal there. The
territorial effects rationale for regulating these harms is the same as the
rationale for regulating similar harms in the non-Intemet cases. The medium
by which the harm is transmitted into the regulating jurisdiction-be it
economic interdependence, postal mail, wind curients, or the Internet-is not
relevant to the justification for regulating it.
The effects criterion tells us that it is legitimate for a nation to apply its
regulation to an extraterritorial act with harmful local effects. It does not tell
us whether such a regulation will be efficacious. In most instances, regulation
of extraterritorial activity is efficacious only to the extent that the agents of the
acts have a local presence or local property against which local laws can be
enforced. In this sense, the concept of the extraterritoriality can be misleading.
It does not (usually) mean that a nation enforces its law abroad. Rather, it
means that a nation uses the threat of force against local persons or property to
punish, and thus regulate, extraterritorial acts that cause local harms. If the
16. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
17. See Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252, modified 890 F.2d 569 (2d Cir.
1989).
18. See Georgiav. Tennessee CopperCo., 237 U.S. 474 (1915). Cf. Trail SmelterCase (U.S. v. Canada),
3 R.I.A.A. 1911 (1949).
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extraterritorial source has no local presence or property, the efficacy of the local
regulation is diminished (but, as we shall see in a moment, not eliminated). In
this sense the enforceable scope of a local regulation is much more significant
than its putative scope. And the enforceable scope is largely limited by the old-
fashioned conception of territorial sovereignty: a nation has plenary
enforcementjurisdiction over persons and property within its borders but little
if any beyond. 9
The relative importance of the enforceable (as opposed to the putative)
scope of a regulation is often not noticed with respect to extraterritorial
regulation of non-Internet activities. Nor are the largely territorial limitations
on this scope. This is probably because in non-Internet cases the extraterritorial
source of local harm is frequently a firm with some local presence (property,
employees, business contracts) against which the local regulating jurisdiction
can assert leverage in trying to alter extraterritorial behavior. For example, the
United States can apply its antitrust laws to alter the acts of English reinsurers
in London because these reinsurers have widespread contractual relations with
American firms that they want to preserve.20 Similarly, the European
Community can impose strict and almost deal-breaking conditions on a Federal
Trade Commission-approved merger between two U.S. companies with no
manufacturing facilities in Europe because of the many offices, agents, and
contracts that the U.S. companies have in Europe." In both cases the foreign
company subject to local regulation has a local business presence that is more
beneficial than the costs of local regulation; otherwise, the foreign company
would eliminate its presence in the regulating jurisdiction and avoid the
regulation.
At first glance, the architecture of the Internet transactions appears to differ
from real space in a way that makes regulatory leakage a more serious problem.
For the Internet makes it very easy and very inexpensive for individuals outside
the regulating jurisdiction to send harmful content into the regulating
jurisdiction that is difficult to intercept at the border. Since individuals abroad
rarely have local presence or assets, it appears that many local regulations of
Internet activity will be inefficacious. As James Boyle puts the point: "If the
king's writ reaches only as far as the king's sword, then much of the content of
19. 1 set aside for present purposes one relatively rare method of extraterritorial enforcement: military
invasion. See, e.g., United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506 (S.D. Fl. 1990).
20. See Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 796.
21. See McDonnell Douglas-Boeing Link Gets Europe Approval, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 1997, at D4;
Edmund L. Andrews, Boeing Concession Averts Trade War With Europe, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1997, at Dl.
480 [Vol. 5:475
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the Net might be presumed to be free from the regulation of any particular
sovereign." 2
This phenomenon-which we might label offshore regulation evasion-is
not limited to the Internet. For example, corporations reincorporate in
jurisdictions with favorable internal affairs laws, and drug lords send cocaine
into the United States from South America. Closer to point, offshore regulation
evasion has been a prominent characteristic of other communication media.3
For example, Radio-Free Europe broadcast into the U.S.S.R. but lacked a
regulatory presence there; television signals are sometimes broadcast from
abroad by an entity with no local presence; and a person living in one country
can libel a person in another via telephone. Like the content source of many
Internet transactions, the extraterritorial source of these and many other non-
Internet activities is often beyond the enforceable scope of local regulation.
However, this does not mean that local regulation is inefficacious. In
cyberspace, as in real space, offshore regulation evasion does not prevent a
nation from indirectly regulating extraterritorial activity that has local effects.
The reason once again has to do with territorial sovereignty as traditionally
conceived. A nation retains the ability to regulate the extraterritorial sources
of local harms through regulation of persons and property within its territory.
This form of indirect extraterritorial regulation is how nations have, with
various degrees of success, regulated local harms caused by other
communications media with offshore sources and no local presence.24 It is also
how nations have begun to regulate local harms caused on the Internet by
extraterritorial content providers. For example, nations penalize in-state end-
users who obtain and use illegal content or who otherwise participate in an
illegal cyberspace transaction.2" They also regulate the local means through
which foreign content is transmitted. For example, they regulate in-state entities
22. James Boyle, Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty, and Hard-Wired Censors, 66
U. CrN. L. REv.177, 179 (1997).
23. See generally Stephen D. Krasner, Global Communications and National Power: Life on the
Pareto Frontier, 43 WORLD POL. 336 (1991).
24. See id. at 340.
25. See, e.g,. Computer Information Network and Internet Security, Protection and Management
Regulations (Approved by the State Council on Dec. 11, 1997 and promulgated by the Ministry of Public
Security on Dec. 30, 1997) (visited Apr. 6, 1998) http://www.gilc.org/speech/china/net-regs-1297.html
(describing Chinese law proscribing criminal punishment for in-state users who access or transmit prohibited
conduct); IntemetGambling Prohibition Act, H.R. 2380, S. 474, 105th Cong. (1997) (pending bill that provides
for punishment of persons in the United States who engage in Internet gambling).
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that supply or transmit information.26 Or they regulate in-state hardware and
software through which Internet transmissions are received." These and related
local regulations affect the cost and feasibility within the regulating nation of
obtaining content from, or participating with, offshore regulation evaders. In
these ways, local regulations indirectly regulate extraterritorial content supply.
In both the Internet and non-Internet contexts, such indirect regulation will
rarely be perfect in the sense of eliminating evasion. But of course few if any
regulations are perfect in this sense. And regulation need not be perfect to be
effective.' The question is always whether the regulation will heighten the costs
of the activity sufficiently to achieve its acceptable control from whatever
normative perspective is deemed appropriate. Whether indirect regulation of
Internet content transmitted from abroad will achieve acceptable control
depends on one's normative commitments and on empirical and technological
questions that remain unresolved.
There are several reasons to believe that Internet regulation will be at least
26. For example, a new German law imposes liability on Internet access providers "if they are aware of
[illegal] content" and fail to use "reasonable and technically possible" means to block it. Germany to Enforce
Child-Friendly Internet, Cm. TRIB., July 5, 1997, at 4. Australia is about to implement a similar law. See
Electronic Foundation Frontier, Internet Regulation in Australia (visited Apr. 6, 1998) http://www.efa.org.au
/Issues/Censor/cens lhtml. Similarly, Internet service providers have been held liable in the United States for
facilitating the transmission of content deemed illegal in the regulating jurisdiction. See Stratton-Oakmont, Inc.
v. Prodigy Service Co., 1995 WL 323710 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. May 24, 1995). See also Internet Gambling
Prohibition Act, H.R. 2380, S. 474 (authorizing federal authorities to order Internet service providers to shut
down offending gambling sites).
27. Several Middle Eastern and Asian countries have taken these steps. See Madanmohan Rao, Persian
Gulf Net Censorship: Governments Force Server Blockades, (visited March 23, 1998) http://mediainfo.
elpress.com/ephome/news/newshtmlwebnews/globl 003.htm (discussing how Middle Eastern states have set up
"software blockades and proxy servers" to control Internet content flows); Wu, supra note 15 (describing
similar measures in Singapore and China). Many believe that the United States will impose similar, but perhaps
more modest, restraints. See Boyle, supra note 22, at 179. See also Lawrence Lessig, What Things Regulate
Speech (visited Oct. 22, 1997) <http://www/si.umich.edu/prie/tprc/abstracts97/lessig.pdf>. The FCC has
already required the television V-chip to be placed in all computers capable of receiving broadcast
transmissions. See FCC Ruling Gives Go-ahead to Tri- Vision's V-Chip, FINANCIAL POST, Mar. 13, 1998, at
3.
28. As Lessig correctly argues:
A regulation need not be absolutely effective to be sufficiently effective. It need not
raise the cost of the prohibited activity to infinity in order to reduce the level of that
activity quite substantially. If regulation increases the cost of access to this kind of
information, it will reduce access to this information, even if it doesn't reduce it to zero.
That is enough tojustify the regulation. If government regulation had to show that it
was perfect before it was justified, then indeed there would be little regulation of
cyberspace, or of real space either. But regulation, whether for the good or the bad, has
a lower burden to meet.
See Lawrence Lessig, The Zones of Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1403, 1405 (1996).
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modestly successful. Territorial regulatory regimes governing pornography,
encryption, and trademark (among many other things) have significantly
affected Internet activity to date, and the vehement opposition to various forms
of territorial regulation of the Internet suggests that such regulation will
continue to make certain Internet activities prohibitively costly. In addition,
governments have successfully "embed[ed] or hardwire[d] the legal regime in
the technology itself' in numerous other communications contexts.29 Again, the
impassioned opposition to various attempts at this latter form of Internet
regulation suggests that a similar strategy might have efficacy here as well.3"
In addition, many nations have a common interest in regulating many types of
Internet transactions such as fraud, criminal activity, certain forms of anti-
competitive activity, and so forth. If other communications media are any
guide, international regulatory harmonization is likely under these conditions
and might minimize regulatory leakage.3' And, as Perritt notes, the Internet
likely facilitates rather than undermines this international harmonization
process.32
III. SIMULTANEOUS UNIVERSAL REGULATION
I have focused thus far on the claim that territorial regulation of the Internet
is unfeasible. My arguments might appear to support a somewhat different type
of anti-regulation claim. This is the claim that because Internet content can
simultaneously appear in every territorial jurisdiction in the world, all Internet
activity is simultaneously subject to all national regulations. This appears to
lead to the normatively problematic conclusion that all "Web-based activity.
29. Boyle, supra note 22, at 180. See also Lawrence Lessig, Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace,
45 EMORY L.J. 869 (1996).
30. See American Civil Liberties Union, Fahrenheit 451.2: Is Cyberspace Burning? How Rating and
Blocking Proposals May Torch Free Speech on the Internet (visited April 12, 1998) http://www.aclu.org/
issues/cyberbuming.htinl; Lawrence Lessig, Tyranny in the Infrastructure, WIRED, July 1997, at 46.
31. See Krasner, supra note 5.
32. See Perritt, Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, supra note 3. To some extent the need for international
harmonization is an acknowledgment of the limitations of a purely territorial approach to regulation. These
limitations inhere in territorial regulation of just about all transnational transactions. The demand for
international harmonization is not new to the Internet.
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•. must be subject simultaneously to the laws of all territorial sovereigns. 33
We shall see in a moment that territorial regulation ofInternet transactions
does not in fact lead to simultaneous universal regulation of the Internet. It is
worth noting, however, that one jurisdiction's legitimate regulation of the
harmful local effects of extraterritorial activity does not become normatively
problematic simply because the harm-producing activity also produces harmful
effects in many other jurisdictions and is thus subject to territorial regulation
there as well. It is uncontroversial that pollution emitted in State A that wafts
into State B can be regulated by State B. State B's regulation does not become
less legitimate because the pollution also causes damage in States C-Z. This is
true even if the agent of the pollution does not know which way the wind blows
and thus does not know the states into which the pollution will travel.
The same analysis applies to the Internet. A government's regulation ofthe
harmful local effects of an Internet transaction does not become less legitimate
because the effects of the same transaction are regulated differently in other
jurisdictions where these effects appear. These multiple regulation scenarios
raise a normative concern because of the spillover effects of each nation's
Internet regulation. As we will examine below, these spillovers might call for
multijurisdictional harmonization. But by themselves they do not make
unilateral regulation illegitimate.
The problem of notice presents another apparent normative quagmire for
Internet regulation. Many fear that content providers do not know where in the
world their information goes, and thus do not have notice of the laws they might
be violating. This problem too is greatly exaggerated. First, the limits on
enforcementjurisdiction mean that most individual content providers never have
to worry about violating foreign laws. Second, content providers can take
steps-such as conditioning access to content on presentation of geographical
identification-to control content flows geographically. As digital signature
and filtering technology continues to develop to facilitate such geographical
identification, the Internet content provider will look like any other"real space"
content provider who must take care not to send his content into ajurisdiction
where it is illegal. Third, even in the absence of such technology, a content
provider is on notice that his information might flow into ajurisdiction where
it is illegal. It is a complicated question beyond the scope of this essay whether
this notice suffices to make it fair to impose an obligation on the content
provider to learn whether this information is illegal in the regulating territory.
33. Johnson & Post, supra note I, at 1374.
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Ignoring for the moment the limits on enforcement jurisdiction and the
availability of geographical flow control devices, such a regime places
enormous burden on content providers that might significantly curtail Internet
activity. But there is nothing sacrosanct about Internet speed, or about a
foreign content provider's right to send information everywhere in the world
with impunity. From the perspective of the regulating jurisdiction, the content
provider is knowingly sending information into ajurisdiction; like all persons
who do the same in real space, the content provider benefits from this in-state
activity, is deemed to know the law of the territory, and is subject to penalties
for non-compliance (assuming that enforcement is possible). 4
In any event, this quagmire is much less significant than it appears. The
claim that unilateral national regulation of the Internet invariably leads to
simultaneous (and oft-conflicting) regulation of the Internet is as exaggerated
as the claim about the unfeasibility of territorial regulation of the Internet. And
for the same reason: traditional territorial sovereignty. As explained above, a
nation cannot enforce its laws against an individual content provider from
another country unless the content provider has a local presence. The vast
majority of individuals who transact on the Internet have no presence or assets
in the jurisdictions that wish to regulate their information flows. Such
regulations will apply mainly to service providers and users with a physical
presence in the regulating jurisdiction. And indeed this has been the focus of
regulation to date.3"
There is another class of content providers that have been subject to
territorial regulation. These are extraterritorial content providers over whom
a nation or state can legitimately obtain personal jurisdiction andagainst whom
a nation or state can enforce a default judgment in a jurisdiction where the
34. For a more comprehensive analysis of this point, see Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, supra note
10.
35. Even with these limitations, an individual content provider in onejurisdiction facespotentialliability
in another jurisdiction when she places information on the web. This potential liability can become an
unforeseen reality when the provider travels to the regulatingjurisdiction, or moves assets there. Such potential
liability in turn might affect the providers' activities at home. This form of regulation is a theoretical possibility,
but should not be exaggerated. No nation has as yet imposed liability on a content provider for unforeseen
effects in an unknown jurisdiction; and the threat of such liability will lessen as content providers continue to
gain cost-effective means to control information flows. Even this potential threat of liability is relatively
insignificant and does not approach the feared claims of massive multiple regulation of individual Interet users.
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provider has assets or presence.36 In the international context this will happen
rarely for, among other reasons, nations do not usually enforce foreign default
judgments based on the application of foreign regulations to activity that was
legal where it took place." The situation is more complicated in the domestic
interstate context, because the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires one state
to enforce defaultjudgments rendered by another state with personal jurisdiction
over the defendant. This threat is attenuated, however, by constitutional limits
on a state's ability to assert personal jurisdiction. The large majority of courts
that have considered the issue have required something more than mere
placement of information on a web page in one state as a basis for personal
jurisdiction in another state where the web page is accessed.38 This effectively
means that a content provider in one state will not be subject to personal
jurisdiction in another unless she knowingly directs content to a particular
jurisdiction where the content is illegal. In this circumstance, the rationale for
asserting personal jurisdiction is precisely the same as in real space-the person
subject tojurisdiction directed activity toward ajurisdiction and gained benefits
from those contacts. It is thus fair to require that entity to adjudicate disputes
arising out of these contacts in that jurisdiction.
In sum, the largely territorial limits on enforcement jurisdiction attenuate
the concern that individual content providers will be exposed to multiple
regulatory regimes. A nation can indirectly regulate extraterritorial content
providers through laws aimed at local entities or property; but direct regulation
of extraterritorial providers-in the sense of imposing liability or punishment
on such providers-will rarely succeed.
36. Ajurisdiction can also enforce its laws against persons whom it can successfully extradite. However,
extradition in Internet contexts will likely be rare. In the domestic interstate context, the obligation for one state
to extradite to another only extends to persons who were physicallypresent in the demanding state at the time
of the crime's commission. This jurisdictional limitation does not apply, of course, when a person in one state
commits a federal crime in another. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996). A
different, but equally forceful, limitation applies to international extradition. The principle of double criminality
that pervades modem extradition treaties requires that the offense charged be criminal in both the requesting and
the requestedj urisdiction; this makes it unlikely that there will be international cooperation in the enforcement
of exorbitant unilateral criminal regulations of cyberspace events. For elaboration of these points, see
Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, supra note 10.
37. See GARY BoRN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LrnGAToN m UNIED STATES COURTS (1996).
38. See Eric Schneiderman & Ronald Komreich, Personal Jurisdiction andInternet Commerce, N.Y.
L.J., June 4, 1997, at Al; Note, World-Wide Volkswagen, Meet the World Wide Web: An Examination of
Personal Jurisdiction Applied to the New World, 71 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 403 (1997).
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IV. SPILLOVER EFFECTS
My basic claims so far have been that (a) territorial regulation of persons
and property are a legitimate and effective way to regulate local harms caused
from abroad via the Internet, but that nonetheless (b) the limits of territorial
sovereignty mean that individual content providers abroad have little to fear
from violating local laws in jurisdictions where their content might appear.
Proposition (b) should not be taken to mean that Internet users outside of the
regulating jurisdiction are immune from the effects of local regulation. As the
preceding discussion of indirect regulation suggests, Internet users outside the
regulating jurisdiction can be affected by the local regulation to the extent that
they are dependent on users, service providers, or content providers with a
presence in the regulating jurisdiction. In this way local regulation of the
Internet produces spillover effects on persons outside of the regulating
jurisdiction, as well as on the regulatory efforts of other countries.3 9
A prominent example of these spillover effects is Germany's threat to
prosecute CompuServe for carrying on-line discussion groups that violated
German anti-pornography laws." CompuServe responded to the threat by
blocking access to these discussion groups in Germany. However, because of
the state of the Internet's architecture, this action had the effect of blocking
access to these discussion groups for CompuServe users in other jurisdictions
where these discussion groups were legal. The German regulation thus
produced massive spillover effects. Most normative perspectives frown on a
nation that exports the costs of its regulation to other nations whose citizens
have no voice in the enactment or enforcement of the regulation. These
spillovers make territorial regulation of the Internet appear normatively
unattractive.
The spillover concern is genuine. But on several grounds its significance
should not be overstated. As an initial matter, spillovers like those produced in
the CompuServe episode are premised to a great degree on the empirical claim
that content providers and Internet service providers cannot control the real
space geographical flow of Internet content. This claim is false. Content flow
is today controlled geographically through a variety of means ranging from
39. 1 will assume for purposes of argument that these spillover effects are negative.
40. See Edmund L. Andrews, Germany's Efforts to Police Web are Upsetting Business, N.Y. TIMES,
June 6, 1997, at Al; Sex on the Internet: When Bavaria Wrinkles its Nose, Must the Whole World Catch a
Cold?, ECONOMIST, Jan. 6, 1996, at 18.
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conditioning access to content on geographical identification, to centralized
servers, to mandated end-user filtering, to the imposition of the severe penalties
for uploading or downloading prohibited information. The question is not
whether the architecture of the Internet can be modified to permit greater
geographical content discrimination; the question is the cost of modification and
the degree of effectiveness. The intense demand by Internet users, content
providers, service providers, and regulating jurisdictions to reduce such
spillovers is driving the development of technologies that lower the costs of
discrimination and increase its effectiveness. The sufficiency of these
developments will depend on yet unanswered empirical and technological issues.
The point is that it is wrong to say that control is impossible; here as elsewhere
the feasibility of control is a question of the importance to the sovereign of
control and the costs of imposing such control.
Even assuming the worst about the feasibility of geographic content control
of Internet information flows, spillover effects caused by territorial regulation
of the Internet do not undermine the legitimacy of such regulation. As the
traditional territorialists realized,4t spillover effects are an inevitable
consequence of unilateral territorial regulation of transnational transactions.
For example: When a security sold legally in Japan violates U.S. securities
laws, the application of the anti-fraud provisions of the U.S. securities
regulations produce spillover effects by making this extraterritorial activity
more costly, and by diminishing the force of Japanese law on Japanese soil. If
instead Japanese law governed the situation, persons in the United States would
have been harmed and U.S. regulations undermined. The same point applies to
unilateral regulation of the Internet. Spillovers are present when activity
deemed legal in one country causes harm deemed illegal in another, regardless
of which nation's law applies. These spillovers can be diminished through
international harmonization. But they can only be eliminated by abolishing
national (as opposed to international) lawmaking entities altogether, or by
eliminating transnational activity. Neither option is remotely plausible. In this
41. Both Joseph Story and Ulrich Huber, for example, contemplated that purely territorial regulations
would have indirect extraterritorial effects. See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ONTHE CONFLICrOF LAWS § 20
(3d ed. 1846) (arguing that no state can "directly affect or bind property out of its own territory) (emphasis
added); Ulrich Huber, De Conflictu Legum Diversarum in Diversis Imperiis [Of the Conflict of Diverse Laws
in Diverse Governments] (1689), translated in ERNEST LORENZEN, supra note 8, at 163-64 ("laws of one
nation can have no force directly within another.") (emphasis added).
[Vol. 5:475
1998] THE ABIDING SIGNIFICANCE OF TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY 489
sense the spillovers from territorial regulation of the Internet are inevitable.42
Of course the spillover effects from territorial regulation can be great or
small, and one might think that they will be especially great when territorial
sovereigns regulate the Internet. The size of the spillover effects from territorial
regulation of Internet information flows ultimately depends on the development
of filtering and identification technology, and on the scope of international
harmonization. Independent of these factors, however, it is important to see
why the existence of spillovers alone does not undermine the legitimacy of
territorial regulation.
Consider a hypothetical Arkansas statute that bans Internet gambling and
imposes very large criminal fines on Internet Access providers that facilitate
transmission of Internet gambling services into the state. When zealous local
officials in West Memphis, Arkansas use America Online (AOL) to gain access
to Internet gambling web pages that violate the statute, they threaten to
prosecute the company. The company decides to shut down access to the
offending Web page rather than face prosecution. Because of the state of
Internet technology, this has the consequence of shutting off access to the page
by all AOL users around the globe. West Memphis officials seem justified in
applying the Arkansas law on territorialist grounds. They would be able to
regulate this gambling if the roulette wheel or poker table were physically
present in Arkansas, or if the gambling were facilitated by interstate telephone;
the medium that transmits the effects of gambling into the state does not appear
relevant to the territorialistjustification of the regulation. But is itfair for West
Memphis officials to govern the world in this way?"
I believe so. As for fairness to AOL: the company receives financial and
other benefits from its presence (servers, offices, clients) in Arkansas. Without
this presence, West Memphis enforcement threats would be empty. AOL need
not remain in Arkansas. It could leave. Its decision to stay and comply with
Arkansas regulations might increase the price of its services in Arkansas and
elsewhere. For AOL, this is a cost of doing business via the Internet. Such
42. Most prominent academic choice-of-law methodologies aim to minimize these spillovers while atthe
same time preserving the sovereign prerogative to regulate effects within national borders. This is the goal, for
example, of such different approaches as the interest-balancing approach, RESTATEMENT(TmRD)OF FOREIGN
RELATIONs LAW, supra note 9, § 403, William Baxter's comparative impairment approach, William Baxter,
Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. Rev. 1 (1963), Larry Kramer's multistate canons of
construction, Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 277 (1990), and Lea Brilmayer's
strategy to maximize state policy objectives, LEA BRILMAYER, CONFIucr OF LAWS 169-218 (2d ed. 1995).
43. Cf. Buchanan v. Rucker, 9 East 192 (King's Bench 1808) ("Can the Island of Tobago pass a law to
bind the rights of the whole world?").
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costs are driving development of Internet filtering technology that will enable
geographical and related discrimination on the Internet. But in the absence of
such technology, application of the Arkansas law appears to fall within
traditional reciprocity-based justifications for regulating local effects. AOL
voluntarily chooses to do business in Arkansas and receives many benefits from
this business; it must therefore accept the burdens of Arkansas's (non-
discriminatory) state regulation.
As for fairness to AOL users outside of Arkansas: the Arkansas regulation
does not unfairly burden them either. They remain free to choose among scores
of Internet access providers that are not affected by the Arkansas regulation.
More importantly, the spillover concern cuts in both directions. The Arkansas
regulation produces spillover effects abroad; but extraterritorial acts of
providing gambling services to in-state users produces spillover effects in
Arkansas. Even if spillover minimization were the criterion of legitimacy for
territorial regulation of harmful local effects (which it is not), the Arkansas
regulation would not be illegitimate unless the costs of the regulation, including
the balance of positive and negative spillover effects abroad, were greater than
the costs of non-regulation (including the in-state costs of the gambling).
There is a final important point about the spillover effects of territorial
regulation of the Internet. Spillover minimization is not the criterion measure
of a territorial regulation's legitimacy. Even if it were, it would not follow that
Internet transactions should be self-regulated rather than regulated by territorial
sovereigns." This is so for two reasons. First, the most effective way to reduce
or eliminate these spillovers is through international harmonization. Second, in
the absence of international harmonization it will often be the case that Internet
self-regulation produces more significant negative spillover effects on non-
Internet participants than the national regulations designed to minimize these
spillovers. The Internet is not a self-contained medium. It produces real world
harms-harms that Internet users have failed to internalize, and that
governments legitimately regulate.
44. For arguments to this effect based on the spillover-reduction criterion, see David Post, Governing
Cyberspace, 43 WAYNE ST. L. REv. 155 (1996); David Post, "Chaos Prevailing on Every Continent": A New
Theory of Decentralized Decision-Making in Complex Systems, 73 CH.-KENT L. REv. (forthcoming 1998).
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CONCLUSION
Beginning with the invention of the telegraph in the nineteenth century,
commentators have predicted that each new communication advance would
undermine the nation-state. None of these predictions has proven to be true.
Like other communications breakthroughs, the Internet will affect the way
individuals interact and thus the way nations regulate. However, for many of
the reasons expressed in Dean Perritt's article, the Internet is no more likely to
undermine national sovereignty than did the telephone or satellite or television.
I have tried to alleviate Perritt's residual concerns about the legitimacy and
effectiveness of territorial legal regulation of the Internet. Territorial regulation
faces pressure from a variety of modem factors. But it remains the dominant
method for regulating all transnational transactions in our interdependent world,
including Internet transactions.
Such territorial regulation is invariably messy. I have tried to explain why
regulatory leakage, though inevitable to some degree, does not undermine the
effectiveness of territorial regulation. I have also tried to show why spillover
effects, though also inevitable, do not undermine the legitimacy of territorial
regulation. International harmonization is a solution to both problems. But
harmonization is not a perfect solution because it is sometimes hard to achieve
and, more broadly, because it defeats the benefits of decentralized national
lawmaking. For these reasons, among others, territorial regulation will remain
a central component of Internet regulation.

